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Introduction
In the post 9/11 era a new literature emerged, whose main aim has been to investigate various aspects of terrorism shocks' impacts on capital markets. The extant literature has established the significant -and immediate -negative reaction, to major terrorist attacks, of "ground-zero" countries' capital markets (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Carter and Simkins 2004; Chen and Siems 2004; Drakos 2004; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Maillet and Michel 2005; Gulley and Sultan 2006; Amélie and Darné 2006; Nikkinen et al., 2008) . This literature has also shown that significant negative reactions are also observed to third countries' markets.
However, an apparent gap in the literature, and in general of our understanding of the issue, relates to what is the underlying diffusion mechanism of major terrorist shocks.
In other words, although we suspect that such shocks are indeed transmitted crossnationally, we have no concrete evidence regarding the determinants of their crosssectional variation. To put simply, we do not know why and how much third countries react in the occurrence of a major terrorist incident in another country. Clearly, providing an answer to this question would be of value for policy makers and supervision authorities, but more importantly for portfolio managers. Essentially, knowledge of these reaction patterns could assist portfolio managers in assessing whether diversification is possible. For instance, if terrorism shocks exhausted their effect within the "ground-zero" country, then they could be thought as being part of its idiosyncratic risk, and therefore able to be diversified away. If however terrorism shocks were diffused across markets, the diversification scope would depend on the pattern of diffusion. For instance the diversification gains would evaporate if shocks spread uniformly. In contrast, if shocks are non-uniformly diffused, diversification would be possible, provided that one could pin down the basic anatomy of the transmission mechanism.
Casual empiricism suggests that major shocks, especially of an adverse nature, or crises, even if considered as being mainly local, tend to diffuse cross-nationally. This diffusion is known as contagion, broadly defined as the spread of market disturbances from one country to another. A burgeoning literature has provided the theoretical underpinnings for several alternative explanations for the spread of shocks from their original location (the "ground-zero" country) to third countries (for excellent and extensive reviews see Wolf 1999; Dornbusch et al., 2000) . One explanation places emphasis on economic linkages, where essentially the spillover to a given third country depends on the degree of its integration with the world markets (Calvo and Reinhart 1996; Masson 1998; Forbes and Rigobon 2002) . We hereafter call this diffusion mechanism the world integration channel. Another explanation that has been proposed, similar in spirit, suggests that the transmission of shock to a country is facilitated by its economic ties with the "ground-zero" country. We hereafter call this transmission mechanism bilateral integration channel. Another class of explanations highlights the role of various 'irrational' phenomena triggered by investors' behavior (Calvo and Mendoza 2001; Pritsker 2001; Kodres and Pritsker 2002) . Among this class, we consider the role of liquidity constraints arising in the event of a major shock that may lead investors to sell assets in third countries to meet margin calls. Hence, according to this channel the contagion increases with a country's capital market liquidity. We hereafter call this contagion mechanism the liquidity channel.
In the present study we make a first attempt to explore the determinants of terrorist shock diffusion. In particular, focusing in the post 9/11 period, we model stock market reaction patterns across 68 countries on the days of two major terrorist events (Madrid attack, London attack). Reaction is measured by the daily abnormal return, controlling for a three-factor world asset pricing as well as distributed lags of domestic returns. Then the analysis investigates whether the three alternative transmission channels contain any significant explanatory power for abnormal returns.
Our empirical findings suggest that terrorism shocks are indeed diffused crossnationally, and moreover this diffusion is non-uniform. In particular, we find empirical support for the world integration channel since trade and financial linkages to world markets emerge as important 'predictors' for a country's stock market reaction to terrorist events. Among the trade and financial linkages considered, a country's share in the world trade is able to explain the highest percentage of abnormal return variation in the occurrence of a major terrorist incident (about 12 %). Additionally, the bilateral integration channel is also in operation, where we find that a third country's trade linkages with the "ground-zero" country explain about 24 % of stock market reaction.
Moreover we find empirical support for the liquidity channel with the value of stock trading explaining about 6 % of stock market reaction. A hybrid model including proxies for all three channels is able to explain about 24 % of abnormal return variation in the occurrence of major terrorist shocks.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the general setup within which one can model the transmission mechanism of terrorist shocks. Section 3 describes data sources, the construction of variables and their sample properties. Section 4 presents the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings.
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.
Returns' generation and shock transmission

The baseline pricing framework
Our departure point is the asset pricing framework driving international stock market returns. The first building block is the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965) , where in an international context the global value-weighted market portfolio is the relevant risk factor (Grauer et al. 1976; Adler and Dumas 1983) .
Then we consider an international version of the three-factor model French 1993, 1996) This relationship becomes estimable when we allow for a stochastic shock that generates possibly non-spherical deviations from the long-run as follows: periods (i.e in the absence of major terrorist events) and periods where such events occur.
So returns are determined as follows: 
The parameter ( ) i γ captures the sensitivity of third countries' returns to the news of terrorist attack occurrence in another country and our prior is that it will carry a negative sign. Thus, provided that ( ) 0 i γ < , the realization of a terrorist shock will be diffused to third countries. Moreover, the returns in 'normal' periods (i.e in the absence of major terrorist events) are driven by fundamentals as described by a standard asset pricing model. In contrast during non-normal periods, although fundamentals continue to play a role, returns exhibit a transitory deviation from equilibrium. Hence, the following holds:
This expression suggests that third countries' abnormal returns on days that major terrorist events occur are, on average, lower than returns on normal periods. This is a testable implication that we will explore later on.
A look into potential diffusion mechanisms
Recall that our main purpose is to investigate the determinants of third countries' stock market reactions to terrorism shocks. To tackle this issue we consider three types of potential transmission channels. The first focuses on a country's economic linkages with world markets and in particular considers trade and financial linkages. If a country has a high degree of real (trade) or financial linkages with global markets, it is expected to exhibit a more extensive response given a shock in another country. In contrast, countries that are not sufficiently integrated are to some extent immune to the shock (Calvo and Reinhart 1996; Masson 1998; Forbes and Rigobon 2002) . The second brings to centre stage a country's relationship vis-à-vis the "ground-zero" country, and in particular considers their bilateral trade and financial linkages. The third emphasizes a country's stock market liquidity. The literature advocates that in the occurrence of a major terrorist event, causing downward pressure to a country's asset prices, market participants would benefit most from selling in highly liquid markets since this lowers the impact of their sell orders on prices. (Kodres and Pritsker 2001; Calvo and Mendoza 2001) .
Going back to the return generation process, we investigate whether third countries' reaction to major terrorist events is explained by a given channel ( )
in the spirit of Harvey (1995, 1997) , Ng (2000) , Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Bekaert et al. (2005) , we allow third countries' sensitivity to be time-varying as follows:
Then expression (3) becomes: This expression nests various alternative possibilities regarding the diffusion of terrorist shocks, described below:
Suppose for the time being that the sign configuration shown in Case 3 is valid then it would imply that:
This expression has two testable implications: (a) third countries' abnormal returns (stock market reactions) are significantly lower on days of major terrorist events' occurrence, i.e terrorist shocks are diffused cross-nationally, and (b) the size of reaction (absolute magnitude of abnormal returns) increases with a country's exposure to a given channel. 
Data issues
Returns and systematic risk factors
The three benchmark portfolios denoting the risk factors are proxied by the global portfolio of high book-to-market stocks (value) and the return on low book-to-market (growth) stocks (hml, high minus low), which proxies the value or distress premium. 
Construction of transmission channels' proxies
We also consider whether there are any differences between the explanatory powers of export and import linkages. In order to do so we construct the following variables: 
We also construct alternative proxies by breaking total portfolio investment assets into equity and debt securities as follows: 
In order to capture the linkages with the "ground-zero" country we resort to two metrics. The first captures bilateral trade linkages, and is defined as the percentage their bilateral imports and exports ( ) 
The data for the trade bilateral linkages were obtained from the United Nation's Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). The UN also compiles a similar database covering services trade, however there are severe limitations due to a substantial portion of missing data.
The second measures a country's overall financial linkages with the "groundzero" country, defined as the percentage their bilateral financial linkages ( ) , gzc i y bifina represent to both countries' financial linkages with the rest of the world; 
Using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators we proxy a country's stock market liquidity by two alternative metrics; the stock market capitalization ( )
as a ratio to gross domestic product, and the value of stock trading ( )
as a ratio to gross domestic product.:
*100
In Table 1 we report the basic descriptive statistics for the potential transmission channel proxies, while in Table 2 we report their pairwise sample correlations. Note the strong correlation between any pair of proxies belonging to the same channel, which is indicative of the commonality in information that precludes their joint inclusion as explanatory variables in any model. In contrast, the correlations of proxies between channels are substantially lower, allowing one to consider combinations of channels as regressors.
---------- Table 1 ---------- Table 2 ---------- Table 3 provides some important background information related to these attacks.
Identifying major terrorist attacks: the stimulus
---------- Table 3 ----------
Econometric methodology
We use a flexible empirical specification whose core is a three-factor world model where, apart from the current values of the risk factors, we also include up to five lags to capture any non-synchronization in trading. In addition, we allow for a similar autoregressive structure for country returns. In order to capture any calendar anomalies we use fixed month and day effects, over and above year effects (Gibbons and Hess 1981; Jaffe and Westerfield 1985; Kato and Shallheim 1985; Board and Sutcliffe 1988; Choudhry 2001 ).
The employed baseline empirical model is of the following form: 
Given the panel dimension we condition on country heterogeneity allowing for an unobserved effect i µ treated as random, assuming that ( ) , 0 , ,
A well established empirical regularity is the volatility clustering exhibited by daily returns (Engle 1982; Bollerslev 1986 ). Thus, in order to control for this we employ a Pooled Panel GARCH (PP-GARCH hereafter) model for the conditional volatility of stock returns (Cermeno and Grier 2006) . Although multivariate GARCH models are also available, they are not practical for most panel applications because they require the estimation of a large number of parameters which consumes degrees of freedom rapidly.
In contrast, PP-GARCH estimation by imposing common dynamics on the variancecovariance process across cross-sectional units reduces the number of parameters dramatically ensuring parsimony. We then allow a more flexible specification for the error term with:
In particular, assuming that , , 0, where the * θ 's, ψ 's, η 's and ρ 's denote unknown constant parameters to be estimated.
The effect of transmission channels
In order to investigate whether linkages contain significant information for abnormal returns, we recover the residuals ( ) Provided that a particular set of hypotheses is rejected, it would imply that the associated channel of diffusion is in operation and furthermore, that the diffusion of terrorist shocks is non-uniformly distributed across countries. Thirdly we embark on a comparison between potential diffusion channels in terms of their relative explanatory power over abnormal returns.
Empirical results
Preliminary unconditional analysis
As a prelude to the subsequent econometric analysis we provide some descriptive statistics that will shed light in data properties. The sample mean of (pooled) realized returns excluding the days of major attacks was 0.092 % with a standard deviation of 1.26 %, while the corresponding figures on the days of these attacks were -0.409 % and 1.35
%. This information is indicative of large negative market reactions on days of major attack occurrences.
Main Results
Before we move to the investigation of our main hypotheses, we first estimate the parameters of the three-factor world model under a set of alternative techniques and specifications, with the aim to select the one which more adequately fits daily returns. In particular, we use a Random-Effects, and three Pooled Panel GARCH models; a PP-ARCH(1), a PP-ARCH(2) and a PP-GARCH(1,1) (estimation results are given in Table   A1 in the Appendix, part B). The RE model is outperformed by its PP-GARCH counterparts, since in every specification the parameters in the conditional volatility equation are highly significant, suggesting that volatility clustering is present. Then after a sequence of Likelihood Ratio tests, the PP-GARCH(1,1) emerges as the preferred specification.
Then, we recover the residuals obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, which we regress on each of the potential transmission channels, considering three competing specifications (a linear, a quadratic and a cubic). Based on formal hypotheses tests we selected the specification that best fitted the data (detailed results are provided in the in Tables A2-A6 in the Appendix, part B).
The role of the world integration channel
In Table 4 we report the results from projecting abnormal returns to proxies of the world integration channel corresponding to the selected specifications. All trade linkages' proxies contain significant explanatory power for abnormal returns. The relationship between abnormal returns and linkages is non-linear, and in particular is found to be cubic for overall trade and imports, while quadratic for exports. Turning now our attention to linkages' explanatory power (adjusted coefficient of determination) we find that overall trade linkages explain about 14.4 %, while imports and exports are able to explain about 14.5 % and 11 % of abnormal return variation.
---------- Table 4 
---------
In Table 5 we report the results for the financial linkages with world markets.
Total portfolio investment linkages account for 7 % of abnormal returns' variation.
However, the decomposition of total financial linkages into its main constituents, equity and debt linkages reveals that equity investment has a very poor explanatory power (about 2 %). In contrast, debt linkages explain about 8 % of abnormal return variation.
---------- Table 5 ---------Thus, among the proxies for the world integration channel considered, overall trade linkages have the highest explanatory power over cross-country stock market reactions.
The roles of the bilateral linkages and liquidity channels
In Table 6 we summarize the estimation results from regressing abnormal returns on proxies of the bilateral integration and liquidity channels. Trade linkages with the "ground-zero" country emerge as the most important determinant of stock market reaction, accounting for about 24 % of abnormal return variation. Financial linkages with the "ground-zero" countries are also significant, accounting for about 7 % of abnormal return variation. The estimated parameters indicate that, in the occurrence of a major terrorist event in a given country, third countries' stock market reaction increases with their ties with the "ground-zero" country.
As it regards to the liquidity channel, we find that abnormal returns are significantly correlated both with the stock market capitalization and the value of stock market trading. In particular, stock market capitalization explains about 5.5 % of stock market reactions while the value of trading about 6 %. These findings suggest that indeed more liquid markets tend to react more strongly as suggested by theory.
---------- Table 6 ---------
A hybrid model for stock market reactions
Our estimation results suggest that all three transmission channels are in operation when considered separately. Now we construct a hybrid model that brings together all three with the aim to better fit observed stock market reactions. From each channel we select the proxy with the highest explanatory power provided that it is not collinear with the rest of the channel proxies, i.e. overall trade linkages with the world (world integration channel), trade linkages with the "ground-zero" country (bilateral integration channel) and stock market capitalization (liquidity channel). Table 7 summarizes the estimation results. The hybrid model accounts for 24 % of abnormal return variation, whose explanatory power is comparable to that obtained from trade linkages with the "groundzero" country. The hypotheses tests for the significance of each channel, controlling for the presence of the other channels, indicate that only the bilateral integration channel is significant at all conventional levels.
---------- Table 7 ---------
Conclusions
In the present study we make a first attempt to investigate the underlying crossmarket transmission mechanism of major terrorist shocks, which has so far been unexplored. In particular, focusing in the post 9/11 period, we use two major terrorist events (Madrid and London attacks) and model stock market reaction patterns across 68 countries. Reaction is measured by the daily abnormal return, controlling for a threefactor world asset pricing, as well as distributed lags of domestic returns. Then the analysis investigates three potential channels for the cross-country diffusion of terrorist shocks: (i) integration with world markets, (ii) linkages vis-à-vis the "ground-zero" country, and (iii) stock market liquidity.
Our empirical findings suggest that terrorism shocks are indeed diffused crossnationally, and moreover this diffusion is non-uniform. In particular, we find empirical support for the world integration channel since trade and financial linkages emerge as significant predictors for a country's stock market reaction to terrorist events. Among the trade and financial linkages considered, a country's share in world trade is able to explain the highest percentage of abnormal return variation in the occurrence of a major terrorist incident. The bilateral linkages channel is also active where third countries' trade linkages with the "ground-zero" country account for about 24 % of the cross-country variation in reaction to terrorist shocks. Moreover we find empirical support for the liquidity channel since stock market capitalization is also a significant determinant of stock market reaction. A hybrid model were all three channels are jointly included suggest that only bilateral trade linkages with the "ground-zero" country are significant determinants of stock market reaction.
These findings have important implications for supervision authorities but more importantly for portfolio managers. The non-uniform reaction to major terrorist shocks implies that there is ample scope for diversification. Future research could extend the set of explanatory variables including other structural country characteristics over and above linkages, such as market structure, ownership structure and liquidity. In addition, nonfinancial factors could also be explored, such as the impact of terrorism shocks on investor sentiment and risk aversion. Tables   Table A1. Baseline specification Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust standard errors, (d) ( ) trade stands for overall trade linkages with the world, (e) F-test for the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squared term is zero, (h) F-test for model overall significance, (i) ( ) fina stands for overall financial linkages with the world. Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust standard errors, (d) ( ) imp stands for import linkages with the world (e) F-test for the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squared term is zero, (h) F-test for model overall significance, (i) ( ) exp stands for export linkages with the world. Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust standard errors, (d) each column reports the estimation results from the preferred specification (full results for the linear, quadratic and cubic models are provided in the Appendix, (e) ( ) fina , ( ) equ , ( ) debt stand for overall financial, equity and debt linkages with the world respectively , (f) F-test for the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the cubic term is zero, (h) Ftest for model overall significance. 
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